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I. INTRODUCTION

A theory of harm frequently asserted in data breach class actions is
that plaintiffs did not receive the "benefit of the bargain" with defendants.
That is, plaintiffs claim that when they transferred sensitive information
to defendants, they anticipated that the information would remain safe.
When the data were exposed as part of a breach, that "bargain" was not
upheld. For example, Anthem plaintiffs alleged that when purchasing
health insurance, they suffered "loss of the benefit of the bargain with
Defendants to provide adequate and reasonable data security" and
instead received health insurance that was "less valuable than described
in their contracts." Similar theories have been alleged in a variety of data
privacy class actions. 2 For example, in retail breach cases: (i) P.F.

* Partner in the Antitrust and Privacy & Data Security practices at Edgeworth Economics,
L.L.C. I would like to thank Jesse David, Mike Will, and Adam Cooke for their helpful feedback.
1. Fourth Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 120, 135, In re Anthem Data
Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017), ECF No. 714-3 [hereinafter
Anthem Complaint] (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) (alleging that portions
of plaintiffs' insurance premiums were consideration for an insurer's promises to provide data
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Chang'splaintiffs claimed damages on "the cost of their meals" because
they "would not have dined at P.F. Chang's had they known of its poor

data security," 3 and (ii) Neiman Marcus plaintiffs argued they overpaid
because "the store failed to invest in an adequate security system." 4
Methods to analyze benefit of the bargain harm in a class certification
setting have continued to evolve. For example, while P.F. Chang's and
Neiman Marcus plaintiffs did not propose any specific analytical
framework for assessing this theory, Anthem plaintiffs suggested that
they would use a statistical technique called "conjoint analysis" to do so.5
II. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

IN DATA BREACH CLASS ACTIONS AND
POTENTIAL RELEVANCE OF "CONJOINT ANALYSIS"

"The appropriateness of the class action mechanism for adjudicating
a consumer data breach litigation rests crucially on the plaintiffs' ability
to present an analysis capable of determining whether all-or, in some
cases, virtually all-class members could have suffered injury from the
alleged data breach," as well as the estimation of damages on a class-wide

security); In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586, 2016 WL
81792 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016) (alleging a variety of standing theories, including lost benefit of
bargain); In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (claiming plaintiff

purchased her premium subscription on the basis of LinkedIn's statement that its users' data will
be secured in accordance with industry standards); Svenson v. Google Inc., No. 13-cv-04080BLF, 2015 WL 1503429 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2015) (alleging to have signed a contract with Google
indicating plaintiff was to receive a payment processing service that would facilitate her app
purchase while keeping her private information confidential); In re Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (alleging plaintiffs personally spent more on the

defendant's products than they would have, had they known the defendant was not providing the
reasonable security it represented it was providing.); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12cv-8167, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) (asserting plaintiffs overpaid for the products
and services purchased from Barnes & Noble because they were paying for the security measures
Barnes & Noble was supposed to employ to protect credit and debit transaction information).

3. Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2016).
4. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015). The way the

specific "bargain" between plaintiffs and defendants is described varies from case to case.
However, for consistency, this article refers to the feature at issue using Anthem plaintiffs'
terminology: that they understood their purchases to include a feature called "adequate and
reasonable data security." Anthem Complaint, supra note 1, at 120.

5. Notably, Anthem plaintiffs indicated that the conjoint analysis "could not be completed
until after class certification" because "the parameters of the conjoint surveys would depend on

the classes ultimately certified by the Court." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary
Approval of Class Action Settlement at 4, 16, In re Anthem Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD02617-LHK (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2017), ECF No. 869-5.
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basis. 6 Moreover, because plaintiffs often allege multiple theories of
economic harm,7 such an analysis should distinguish between the
damages associated with the different theories. 8
With respect to a benefit of the bargain theory, a consumer's damages
may be measurable as the difference between what the consumer actually
paid for a product (i.e., in the "actual world") and what the consumer
would have paid (i.e., in the "but-for world") 9 for a product that did not
allegedly misrepresent its level of "adequate and reasonable data
security." This difference is meant to represent the "benefit" a defendant
allegedly failed to deliver to its customers. The actual price paid for a
product may be observable from invoices, consumer receipts, or
point-of-sale records. However, the question relevant to assessing impact
and damages is: What price would the consumer have paid if the
defendant appropriately described the bargain at the time of the
transaction, i.e., that it did not include adequate and reasonable data
security?
Conjoint analysis-the technique suggested by Anthem plaintiffs to
assess this question-is a "popular marketing research technique that
marketers use to determine what features a new product should have and

&

6. David Cohen, Michael Kheyfets, Michelle Visser, & Adam Winship, A Rigorous
Analysis of Class Certification Issues in Consumer Data Breach Litigation, 16 PRVACY
SECURITY L. REP. 104, 107 (2017).
7. Id.
8. For example, in instances where plaintiffs have alleged they were harmed due to (i)
fraudulent misuse of the stolen information, as well as (ii) not receiving the benefit of the bargain,
their class certification and damages frameworks should be able to distinguish between the two.
9. As the Anthem plaintiffs described it, they suffered:
[L]oss of the benefit of the bargain with Defendants to provide adequate and
reasonable data security-i.e. the difference in value between what Plaintiffs
should have receivedfrom Defendants when they enrolled in and/or purchased
insurance from Defendants that Defendants represented, contractually and
otherwise, would be protected by reasonable data security, and Defendants'
partial, defective, and deficient performance by failing to provide reasonable

and adequate data security and failing to protect Plaintiffs' Personal
Information from theft."
Anthem Complaint, supra note 1, at 120-21 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Federal Judicial Center,
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011). Note that what the plaintiffs would
have paid in the but-for world is not necessarily the same as what they would have been willing
to pay. As I discuss in more detail below, consumer willingness to pay is just one part of how
prices are set in the real world.
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how it should be priced." 10 In practice, it is implemented by first
conducting a survey which asks respondents to choose among a series of
hypothetical products with a variety of prices and features.
Exhibit 1 illustrates a survey that breaks down a consumer's choice of
which TV to buy into "attributes" such as screen type, screen size, brand,
and price. The consumer is also offered a choice of various combinations
of attribute "levels." By offering respondents different combinations of
attributes (e.g., a 36" Plasma Sony TV for $499 vs. a 46" LED Philips TV
for $899),11 a well-designed conjoint survey aims to gather information
that can be used to study their preferences for individual attributes.
EXHIBIT 112

A typical "Choice task"

"Levels" for

each attribute

"Attributes" Three "Product profiles"
each of four attributes
Once choice data from these surveys are collected, the goal of the
conjoint analysis is to statistically model the weight (called "utility" or
"part-worth") respondents place on a given feature-relative to the

10. Joseph Curry, Data Use: Understanding Conjoint Analysis in 15 Minutes, QUIRK'S
MARKETING REs. REV. (1996), https://www.sawtoothsoftware.com/download/techpap/undcal5.
pdf [hereinafter Curry, UnderstandingConjointAnalysis].
11. In some conjoint surveys, the respondent may be asked to rank the choices from mostto least-preferred. In others, the respondent may be asked to make a single selection from the
available choices.
12. Conjoint Analysis, DOBNEY, http://www.dobney.com/Conjoint/Conjoint-analysis.htm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2018).

2018]

BENEFIT OF THE BUT-FOR BARGAIN

119

products' other features-when making their choices. 13 Moreover, the
respondents' collective valuation (or "willingness to pay") for a feature
can be derived through a calculation involving the "utility" of that feature
and the "utility" of price. 14
Courts have accepted this technique in several patent infringement
cases involving reasonable royalty damages, with the goal of using it to
isolate the value of an allegedly infringing feature by (indirectly)
comparing versions of a product with and without that feature.15 In these
cases, experts have argued that such valuations would have been
considered by the parties in a hypothetical negotiation for royalties. 16
More recently, conjoint analysis has been offered in consumer product
mislabeling class actions. In such cases, plaintiffs allege that a
manufacturer of a consumer product made false or misleading claims, and
aim to use conjoint analysis to estimate the value of the allegedly
misrepresented feature (e.g., the value related to labeling a product as
"All Natural," as compared to one without that label). 17
Whether courts will accept conjoint analysis to certify classes in data
breach cases remains uncertain.18 This Article discusses several key
features of conjoint analysis, as well as challenges for the use of such

13. Curry, UnderstandingConjoint Analysis, supra note 10.
14. To use terminology from Anthem, the survey would seek to identify respondents'
perceived valuation of-or willingness to pay for-adequate and reasonable data security.
Anthem Complaint, supra note 1, at 120.
15. See generally Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846-LHK, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 149741 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73827 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 2011).
16. See cases cited supranote 15.
17. See, e.g., Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2016) (arguing

that the "100% Natural" label on the product was false or misleading because Wesson oils are
made from bioengineered ingredients that plaintiffs contended were "not natural"); In re Dial
Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 312 F.R.D. 36, 47 (D.N.H. 2015) (alleging that a variety

of statements appearing on Dial Complete's product labels, including claims that it "Kills 99.99%
of Germs," is "#1 Doctor Recommended," and "Kills more germs than any other liquid hand
soap" were inaccurate and misleading); In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., No. CV
14-00428 MMM (RZx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199368, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2014) (alleging

that NJOY's failure to include certain harmful ingredients on the label was misleading because
consumers would want to know that the product contained these ingredients before purchasing ecigarettes and that NJOY failed to warn of the harmful effects of inhaling such ingredients).
18. For example, plaintiffs in Anthem indicated that "the Benefit of the Bargain theory
depended upon the results of a conjoint study that could not be completed until after class
certification, and there was no guarantee that Plaintiffs would ultimately have found this type of

damage at all." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action
Settlement at 21, In re Anthem Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24,

2017), ECF No. 869-5 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs also indicated that "it is possible that both the
Benefit of the Bargain theory and the Loss of Value of PII theory could yield large numbers that

would be unpalatable to ajury." Id.
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analysis in the context of class certification issues in data breach
litigation. Specifically, conjoint surveys may: (i) struggle to isolate the
purported bargain at issue in a data breach case; (ii) aim to measure the
customer's willingness to pay for something rather than the price that
prevails in the marketplace; and (iii) not yield results that represent all, or
nearly all, members of a proposed class.
III. "HOLD THE PICKLES, HOLD THE ... ADEQUATE AND REASONABLE
DATA SECURITY": CAN CONJOINT ANALYSIS IDENTIFY THE "BARGAIN"
ON THE RELEVANT FEATURE?
Conjoint analysis does not study actual transactions where sensitive
information is exchanged. Rather, it surveys individuals-who may or
may not be party to a proposed class-on their preferences for certain
products relative to others. At least some products in the respondent's
"choice set" are hypothetical in that they lack a feature that is actually
offered in the real-world marketplace. There are two initial issues relating
to hypothetical products that merit consideration. First, hypothetical
products necessarily have hypothetical features-or actual features in
hypothetical combinations-and prices that are set by the survey
designer. Thus, the choices about what combinations of features are
offered in the hypothetical products, as well as the price points for those
products, necessarily influence the outcome of the survey. More
importantly, however-and perhaps where analysis in data breach cases
begins to depart from that in patent infringement and false claims casesis that it may be difficult to assess how the notion of adequate and
reasonable data security figures into consumers' choices.
For conjoint analysis to serve its purpose, the attributes among which
respondents are choosing must be ones that affect the purchase process.
For example, consumers may have a relatively clear perception of how
much more they would be willing to pay for a mobile phone with a
touchscreen than for one without, or a food product with an "All Natural"
label than a similar product without the label. However, consumers may
have more difficulty with an abstract concept like adequate and
reasonable data security, particularly since that feature is not typically
advertised or described by sellers of consumer products and services.
A conjoint analysis seeking to assess a claim like the one in Anthemi.e., that purchasers of health insurance were deprived of adequate data
security-may face the issue in the real world that consumers do not
explicitly consider data security. For example, one academic study
identified ten "key drivers of consumer choice among health-care
coverage alternatives" as: (i) carrier providing health care coverage; (ii)
doctor quality; (iii) hospital choice; (iv) monthly premium; (v) physician
network; (vi) cost per doctor visit; (vii) prescription coverage; (viii)
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wellness visits coverage; (ix) dental coverage; and (x) vision coverage. 19
Even this list, which goes beyond the six-attribute "choice sets" generally
prescribed by conjoint analysis practitioners, 20 does not leave room to
identify the feature at issue in a data breach litigation. It may be difficult
to tease out respondents' valuation of such a feature if, in a real-world
setting, they would not consider purchasing the "but-for" version of the
product. Moreover, unlike the binary choice between a product either
having an "all-natural" label or not, "data security" may be open to the
respondent's interpretation, further compounding the problem.
An issue with applying conjoint analysis to a "tough-to-value" feature
arose in Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford Motor Co.2 1 In that case, plaintiffs
alleged that certain Ford Explorer vehicles were defective because they
experienced exhaust odor under certain driving conditions. 2 2 Plaintiffs'
expert opined that he could design a conjoint analysis that would enable
him to "determine the difference in value . . . that customers place on a
Ford Explorer with no exhaust leaking into the cabin compared to an
otherwise identical Ford Explorer subject to the problems with
exhaust." 23 The court took issue with this approach, stating "I don't know
how you do that analysis when no one's gonna buy a car if it fills up with
carbon monoxide when you drive it," and indicating that if "you ask a
bunch of people, how much would you pay for a Ford Explorer that has
they're all going to say nothing." 24
carbon monoxide in it . .
Asking survey respondents what they would be willing to pay for
health insurance without adequate and reasonable data security may yield
similar results. Plaintiffs' expert in Anthem recognized that "a critical
aspect of the survey will be to specify a set of levels for the data security
attribute," and hypothesized three formulations of the feature at issue 2 5 :

19. Roger Gates et al., Modeling Consumer Health Plan Choice Behavior to Improve
Customer Value and Health Plan Market Share, 48 J. Bus. REs. 247, 250 tbl. 1 (2000).
20. Paul E. Green & V. Srinivasan, Conjoint Analysis in Marketing: New Developments
with Implicationsfor Research and Practice,54 J. MARKETING 3, 8-9 (1990).
21. Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford Motor Co., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1223 (2014).
22. Id. at 1225.
23. Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion In Limine to Exclude the Testimony of
Steven Gaskin at 2, Sanchez-Knutson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 0:14-CV-61344-WPD (S.D. Fla.
2017), ECF No. 182.
24. Id. at 17. Notably, the Court in this case certified part of the proposed class, despite

Plaintiffs having not actually executed the conjoint analysis at the time of the decision ("[T]he
Court disagrees with Defendant that [plaintiffs' expert], must have already performed his
proposed conjoint analysis for the Court to consider the proffered methodology."). Order Granting
in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 14, SanchezKnutson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 0:14-CV-61344-WPD (S.D. Fla. 2017), ECF No. 148.
25. Expert Report of Peter E. Rossi, In re Anthem Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617LHK (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017), ECF No. 720-30 [hereinafter Rossi Report].
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Example 1:
1. Highest Level: Exceeds industry standards.
2. Intermediate Level: Meets industry standards.
3. Lowest Level: Falls short of industry standards in one
or more important areas.
Example 2:
1. Meets or exceeds industry average for 11 of 13 metrics
used in standard security audits.
2. Meets or exceeds industry average for 8 of 13 metrics
used in standard security audits.
3. Meets or exceeds industry average for 5 of 13 metrics
used in standard security audits.
Example 3:
1. All fundamental data security practices are adhered to.
2. One or more fundamental data security practices is
(sic) not adhered to.
Because Anthem plaintiffs did not ultimately conduct this survey, it
remains unknown which, if any, of these formulations would yield
meaningful information about the value of adequate and reasonable data
security. However, even taken at face value, these questions would raise
concerns about how seriously consumers-who may not be well-versed
in evaluating data security when purchasing health insurance-would
consider plans whose security "falls short of industry standards," or does
not adhere to "fundamental data security practices." 2 6 Thus, if a survey
approach cannot offer a "but-for" product option that is plausible in the
real world, it may not yield results that offer insight into the relevant
question.

26. Greg M. Allenby, Jeff D. Brazell, John R. Howell, & Peter E. Rossi, Economic
Valuation of Product Features, 12 QUANTITATVE MARKETING AND EcON. 421, 433 (2014)
[hereinafter Allenby et al., Economic Valuation] ("[T]he conjoint exercise makes the consumers
(survey respondents) aware of the new product features and assumes that all choice alternatives
are, hypothetically at least, available for purchase.").
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IV. "P-R-I-V-A-C-Y IS PRICELESS TO ME" 27 : CAN CONJOINT ANALYSIS
IDENTIFY AN ECONOMICALLY OBJECTIVE VALUE OF THE RELEVANT
FEATURE?

Even if a conjoint survey is designed to elicit information about a
complex and abstract concept like adequate and reasonable data security,
a relevant next question is what value exactly that analysis would be
estimating. In considering the answer to this question, it is important to
keep in mind that the economic damages award should return plaintiffs
to the financial positions they would have occupied in the absence of the
allegedly unlawful actions. To assess what positions those would have
been, it is necessary to estimate the but-for prices of the products at issue.
A key feature of conjoint analysis, however, is that it estimates a
consumer's self-reported willingness to pay for something. The
consumer's willingness, however, is just one side of the equation that
determines prices. What prices a seller is willing to accept, which
conjoint analysis does not address, also plays a role in determining but-for
prices.
As an initial matter, surveys used in a conjoint analysis solicit from
respondents their subjective valuations of various product features.
Perceptions of "value" may differ based on respondents' individualized
preferences, their varying knowledge about the features and products at
issue, their budget constraints, and the specific alternatives available to
each of them. 2 8 However, despite different perceptions of "value," two
customers purchasing the same product from the same seller at the same
point in time would generally pay the same or similar prices. This means
that a consumer's valuation of a product is not the same as the price of
that product.29 Recognizing the distinction between perceived value and

27. PEARL JAM, VITALOGY (Epic Records 1994). See also Al Weisel, Vitalogy, ROLLING
(Dec. 15, 1994, 5:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/albumreviews/vitalogy1994121 ("'Pry, To' is a one-minute doodle that consists of [Eddie] Vedder spelling out the
word privacy over and over until we get the point already.").
28. For example, a higher-income consumer may be willing to pay more for "data security"
as part of a health insurance product than a lower-income consumer. This does not mean, however,
that if the two customers purchased the same product, the higher-income customer necessarily
paid a higher price. See, e.g., Paul G. Patterson & Richard A. Spreng, Modelling the Relationship
STONE

Between Perceived Value, Satisfaction and Repurchase Intentions in a Business-to-Business,
Services Context: An EmpiricalExamination, 8 INT'L J. SERV. INDUSTRY MGMT. 414, 416 (1997).

29. As a matter of economics, for each purchaser, as well as for all purchasers collectively,
the "value" of a product necessarily equals or exceeds the prevailing price, since no potential
consumer who gets less "value" than the amount of the price would purchase it. The difference
between consumers' "willingness to pay" (or perceived "value") and the prevailing price is called
as "consumer surplus" and is a basic concept in economics. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 139 (7th ed. 2015).
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prevailingprice is essential in assessing a benefit of the bargain claim in
a data breach class action. Consider the following illustrative example:
Based on the features of a particular health insurance
product (e.g., monthly premium, hospital choice, adequate
and reasonable data security, etc.), Customer A has a
subjective "value" of $100 for that product. If Customer A
can purchase the product for $95, the difference between
value and price-i.e., the "consumer surplus"-is $5.
Now suppose that Customer A has a subjective "value"
of $2 for the "data security" feature. If Customer A did not,
in fact, get the "benefit of the bargain," then the value he
received was $98 and not $100. However, because even the
diminished value is above the prevailing price of $95,
Customer A would still buy that product in the but-for world.
Now consider
Customer B:

another-more

security-conscious-

Customer B has a subjective "value" of $96 for the
identical health insurance product, and a $10 value for the
"data security" feature. In the actual world, Customer B
would buy the product because the value to her ($96) is
greater than the prevailing price ($95). The consumer
surplus for Customer B in the actual world is $1. However,
in the but-for world where the $10 "data security" feature is
excluded, Customer B would not pay $95 for $86 of value.
Exhibit 2 summarizes this example.
EXHIBIT

2

$96

$95 prevaling price

-

$98

-

$100

$94 $92

\
p

~ived

$90 -

bo

$88 -

L C.
Purchatse

$86 -

i

pa e.
purchase
orld.

but-for
wd Id.

$84
$82
$80
Customer A
Value of all other attributes

Customer B
A'/

Value of "data security"
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This example illustrates several key issues with conjoint analysis.
First, while the two customers have different perceptions
of "value" (both for "data security" and for the product as a
whole), there is only a single prevailing price: $95. Their
individual preferences only determine whether they buy the
product or not, not the price they pay.
Second, while Customer A received less "value" than he
would have in the but-for world, he would still have
purchased the product absent the "data security" feature (i.e.,
price of $95 versus $98 in value). That is, Customer A would
have still paid $95 for this product even if the "bargain" did
not include the "benefit" of data security. However, given
Customer B's preferences, that customer would not have
purchased the product in the but-for world.
Third, even if each customer's preferences for "data
security" could be measured objectively, an average of $6
(Customer A's value of $2 and Customer B's value of $10)
would be misleading. This is because it would falsely imply
that the Customer A would not have purchased this product
in the but-for world (i.e., price of $95 versus $94 in value).3 0
Ultimately, neither customer's perceived valuation of product features
solely dictates the actual price charged by the seller. Thus, as this example
shows, using conjoint analysis to estimate consumers' subjective values
of product features is not the same as studying prices that would have
prevailed, but for the alleged illegal conduct (i.e., whether the
hypothetical insurance product would have been priced at anything other
than $95 even absent the "data security" feature).
Determining but-for prices requires an analysis of how, if at all, the
product's "market-clearing" price would have changed in the absence of
the allegedly illegal conduct. However, prices are determined not solely
by what consumers are willing to pay but also by what sellers are willing
to accept. If properly designed and implemented, a conjoint survey may
provide an estimate of consumers' willingness to pay for a product
relative to their willingness to pay for a similar product that has slightly
different features. At best, this addresses the "demand" side of the
equation. It cannot, however, offer insight into how, if at all, the seller of
the product (or its competitors) would change its prices.
Consider again the example of the $95 health insurance product.
While it may be that consumers would reduce their willingness to pay for

30. The example can be further complicated by adding a third customer-risk-loving

Customer C-who values "data security" at $0. Applying the average perception of "value" to
Customer C would falsely impute any decline in received value from the removal of this feature.
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it if certain features were removed, that finding offers no insight into what
price the seller would charge. For example, if supply-side competition is
vigorous because many other sellers offer many similar products at
similar prices, the removal of a valued feature may lead to a reduction in
price. If competition is not as vigorous or products are sufficiently
differentiated, it may be that the seller does not reduce the price it charges
even if the feature is removed.3 1 Moreover, if the seller is able to set
pricing at different levels for different groups of customers based on
characteristics of their demand for this product, it may be that the price
charged to some (but not all) customers would change as a result of
removing a feature. Nonetheless, simply assuming that a reduction in
consumers' "value" would necessarily correspond to an identical
reduction in price ignores the supply-side factors that determine prices.
Academic literature on survey-based methods, including conjoint
analysis, indicates that these methods may produce estimates of
"willingness to pay" that are higher than the prices that would prevail in
a real-world setting. As one paper on implementation of conjoint analysis
notes32.

In the context of conjoint studies, feature valuation is
achieved by using various measures that relate only to the
demandfor the products andfeatures and not to the supply.
In particular, it is common to produce estimates of what
some call Willingness To Pay and Willingness To Buy. Both
WTP and WTB depend only on the parameters of the
demand system. As such, the WTP and WTB measure cannot
be measures of the market value of a productfeature as they
do not directly relate to what incremental profits a firm can
earn on the basis of the product feature.
The same paper states that measures of willingness to pay derived
from conjoint surveys33.

[D]o not take into account equilibrium adjustments in the
market as one of the products is enhanced by addition of a

31. In this instance, the survey respondent's hypothesized valuation of the relevant feature
is irrelevant to the but-for world. That is, if the product is priced the same whether it has the
feature at issue or not, the but-for price is the same, even if the consumer perceives receiving less
"value." This outcome may occur in a market for differentiated products, often characterized by
substantial investments by sellers on branding and advertising. See, e.g., B.C. Giri et al., MultiManufacturer Pricing and Quality Management Strategies in the Presence of Brand
Differentiationand Return Policy, 105 COMPUTERS & INDUS. ENGINEERING 146 (2017).
32. Greg M. Allenby et al., Using Conjoint Analysis to Determine the Market Value of
Product Features, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SAWTOOTH SOFTWARE CONFERENCE ON PERCEPTUAL

MAPPING, CONJOINT ANALYSIS AND COMPUTER INTERVIEWING 343 (2013) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
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feature. For this reason, we cannot view either pseudo-WTP
nor WTP as what a firm can charge for a feature-enhanced
product nor can we view WTB as the market share than can
be gained by feature enhancement. Computation of changes
in the market equilibriumdue to feature enhancement of one
product will be required to develop a measure of the
economic value of the feature. WTP will overstate the price
premium afforded by feature enhancement and WTB will
also overstate the impact offeature enhancement on market
share.
Absent such a "computation of changes in market equilibrium," a
conjoint analysis cannot answer the question relevant for the
determination of impact and damages. That is, what prices would
plaintiffs have paid for the "bargain" they received from defendants?
Rather, this approach considers only one side of the price-setting equation
and necessarily overstates the impact (if any) of the foregone "benefit"
on prices. Conjoint analysis does not study actual transactions engaged
in between plaintiffs and defendants, and by considering only part of the
equation, on its own, it cannot account for an important part of the
real-world price-setting process. 34
This feature of conjoint analysis proved relevant in a number of false
claims class actions. For example, the NJOY court did not certify the
proposed class of e-cigarette purchasers because the plaintiffs' expert's
conjoint analysis did not satisfy Comcast35 : "His conjoint methodology
could quantify the relative value a class of consumers ascribed to the
safety message, but it does not permit the court to turn the relative
valuation into an absolute valuation to be awarded as damages."
Similarly, the Saavedra court declined to certify the proposed class of
consumers because the proposed conjoint analysis-which was neither
designed nor executed at the time of the class certification decision"focuse[d] only on the demand side of the equation" and "suffer[ed] from
serious methodological flaws." 36

34. See Greg M. Allenby et al., Computing Damages in Product Mislabeling Cases:
Plaintiff'sMistaken Approach in Briseno v. ConAgra, 45 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 208 (2017)

("[I]t is important to remember that consumer valuations of the misrepresented feature are not the
same as the market price premium associated with the alleged misrepresentation ... If the analysis
employed does not also account for costs and other market forces such as competition among

suppliers, the resulting damages estimates may be significantly overstated.").
35. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification at 8, In re NJOY,
Inc. Consumer Class Action Litigation, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015), ECF No.

325.
36. Saavedra v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2:12-cv-9366-SVW, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179088,
at *11, *18, *33 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2014) (involving alleged misrepresentations regarding risk
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To address the limitation of conjoint analysis as a "demand-side" tool,
some practitioners have suggested a variation on the basic approach.
Specifically, some practitioners have suggested that "if the researcher
seeks qualitative information about how much consumers value . . the
attribute at issue, he can develop a conjoint survey that provides that
average or median consumer WTP." 3 7 In contrast, "if the researcher
wants to assess the price premium associated with the [attribute at issue],
then he will need to develop a conjoint survey that assesses the WTP of
the marginal consumer-i.e., the consumer who is indifferent between
buying and not buying the . . product." 38
Using the "marginal" willingness to pay to assess a "price premium"
for the feature at issue is based on the notion that the marginal consumer's
willingness to pay is equal to the market-clearing price for a product. That
is, if the price were any higher, it would be above that consumer's
willingness to pay. As a result, the idea is that taking the difference
between the actual price of a product and the ostensibly market-clearing
price for the product without the feature at issue can be used to determine
the value of the feature.
This distinction between average and marginal WTP played a role in
the Dial case, where the court certified a proposed class of soap
purchasers and indicated that39:

[W]hile no doubt imperfect in some respects, weak in others, and
subject to challenges on cross-examination, [Plaintiffs' expert's]
proffered means of calculating class wide damages is sufficient to
demonstrate that a price premium for the allegedly falselyclaimed feature(s) exists, and that it can be reliably calculated,
using means and methods generally understood and accepted in
the fields of economics and statistics.
Specifically, the court noted that by determining the marginal consumer's
willingness to pay for the product without the feature at issue, plaintiffs'
expert's model purportedly also determined the maximum price [at which

of experiencing withdrawal symptoms upon discontinuation of using Eli Lilly's antidepressant,
Cymbalta).
37. Lisa Cameron et al., The Role of Conjoint Surveys in Reasonable Royalty Cases,
LAw360 (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/475390/the-role-of-conjoint-surveysin-reasonable-royalty-cases.
38. Id. ("It is the WTP of the marginal consumer that is equivalent to the price premium
associated with the infringing level of the attribute; this marginal consumer can be identified by
offering respondents a 'no buy' option.").
39. In re Dial Complete Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 320 F.R.D. 326, 337 (D.N.H. 2017).
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Dial] could "have sold the equivalent number of products without the
false claim(s)." 4 0
This model, however, only appears to have addressed the supply-side
issue by assuming it away. 4 1 In estimating the marginal consumer's
willingness to pay for the but-for product, plaintiffs' expert in Dial "held
constant" the quantity, i.e., "the number of products with the offending
claims actually sold." 4 2 This assumed that Dial's goal was to sell a fixed
number of soap bars, and in the absence of the feature at issue, it would
have had to lower its price in order to sell that number. 43 This is a strong
assumption, however. As discussed above, the but-for price depends on
the behavior of suppliers, and it may be that even in the absence of the
feature at issue, the same "market-clearing" price would prevail. A "fixed
quantity" cannot simply be assumed; rather, any assumptions about
but-for quantities should be supported through sound economic analysis.
Notably, the assumption that if a feature were removed from a
product, sellers would simply reduce the price of that product by the value
of that feature (or by any amount) may be inconsistent with how
price-setting works in the real world. For example, as an alternative to the
but-for world offered by the Dial plaintiffs' expert, a seller could choose
to keep prices unchanged, allowing for fewer consumers to purchase the
allegedly lower-quality product.4 4 Depending on the industry at issue,
sellers may also use a variety of pricing strategies that do not rely on
valuation of features at all. For example, some retailers may use "line
pricing," a strategy that assigns a uniform list price to a group of similar
products, even if the exact features of those products vary. 45 In other
instances, retailers may use "focal point pricing," whereby products are

40. Id. at 336-37.
41. Notably, whether a conjoint analysis relies on the average, median, or marginal
consumer does not address the issue described above. That is, it appears to be ill-suited for

valuation of abstract product features such as "data security."
42. In re Dial, 320 F.R.D. at 336.
43. Put differently, Dial chooses a price that will yield sales of X soap bars. In the presence
of the false label, Dial can sell X soap bars at the price of $Y. However, once the false label is
removed, Dial can no longer sell X soap bars-because some customers are no longer willing to
pay $Y-and must therefore reduce the price to sell the target number of units. This price
reduction would represent harm from the false claim.
44. In this scenario, damages for some consumers (i.e., those who would continue to
purchase the allegedly lower-quality product at the same price) would be zero. Consumers who
would choose not to buy the product in this but-for world would be injured, but the amount of

damages would depend on a given consumer's second-best available option.
45. See, e.g., Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC) 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79647, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010).
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priced at dollar levels ending in "9" or cent levels ending at "99."46 Under
these kinds of pricing strategies, among others, the prices consumers pay
may not change even if the features of a product do-a reality
inconsistent with the foundational assumption of conjoint analysis. 4 7
Plaintiffs' expert in Anthem also recognized this shortcoming of the
willingness-to-pay analysis, emphasizing that "market price is
determined not only by consumer demand and willingness to pay for a
product feature but also by competition from other manufacturers" and
that "a market price premium therefore differs from willingness to pay
because it is what a firm can charge for a product with a particular feature
rather than just the consumers' valuation of that product feature." 4 8
However, he did not actually conduct an empirical analysis to address
this issue. Rather, he indicated that "with some analysis on the supply
side, it is possible to compute Nash equilibrium prices for health
insurance products associated with a range of data security levels." 49
Additionally, Anthem plaintiffs' expert cited to an academic article he had
written,5 0 which he suggested provided "sufficient detail" on the
"mathematical details of [his] proposed methodology." 5 1 Nonetheless, no
market price premia were actually derived in Anthem, as neither a
conjoint analysis nor a Nash equilibrium analysis were conducted. Thus,

46. See, e.g., Eric T. Anderson & Duncan I. Simester, Effects of $9 PriceEndings on Retail
Sales: Evidence from Field Experiments, 1 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING AND EcON. 93 (2003);
Robert M. Schindler & Patrick N. Kirby, PatternsofRightmost Digits Used in Advertised Prices:
Implicationsfor Nine-Ending Effects, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 192 (1997); Mark Stiving & Russell
S. Winer, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Price Endings with ScannerData, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 57
(1997).
47. See, e.g., Allenby et al., Economic Valuation, supra note 26, at 429 n.6 ("In a conjoint
setting, we abstract from the problem of omitted characteristics as the products we use in our
market simulators are defined only in terms of known and observable characteristics. Thus, the
standard interpretation of the market wide shock is not applicable here. Another interpretation is
that the market wide shock represents some sort of marketing action by the firms (e.g. advertising).
Here, we are directly solving the firm pricing problem holding fixed any other marketing

actions.").
48. Rossi Report, supra note 25, at 27-28.
49. Rossi Report, supra note 25, at 46.
50. Reply Expert Report of Peter E. Rossi at 9 n.9, In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig.,
No. 15-MD-02617-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (citing Allenby et al., Economic Valuation,
supra note 26). Notably, this article outlines a series of assumptions upon which its theory is
based. Determining whether these assumptions hold for a particular product or industry at issue
in a litigation would require an inquiry into the facts of the specific case. Additionally, as the

authors point out, "there is no guarantee that a Nash equilibrium exists for heterogeneous logit
demand." Allenby et al., Economic Valuation, supra note 26; see also Greg M. Allenby et al.,
Valuation of PatentedProductFeatures, 57 J. L. & ECON. 629 (2014).
51. Reply Expert Report of Peter E. Rossi at 9, In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No.
15-MD-02617-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2017).
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whether this type of analysis can yield meaningful results in a real-world
data breach litigation remains an open question.52
V. "ALL FOR ONE AND ONE FOR ALL": CAN CONJOINT ANALYSIS BE
USED TO SHOW A BREACH'S IMPACT ON ALL (OR NEARLY ALL)
PROPOSED CLASS MEMBERS?

Cohen et al., discussed several key elements of constructing an
appropriate "but-for world" in data breach class actions, including testing
(and "falsifiability") of assumptions, as well as rigorous assessment to
determine whether injury can be established using evidence common to
the proposed class. 5 3 Moreover, there are potential problems with using a
sample intended to represent the "average" or "typical" experience of the
proposed class, specifically 54: "[g]iven consumers' idiosyncratic
reactions to a data breach, extrapolating from a small sample of
consumers to thousands (or millions) of other purported class members
whose data was (or may have been) compromised risks reaching the
wrong conclusions."ss
Relying on conjoint analysis in the context of assessing a benefit of
the bargain claim may face this exact issue. In the context of the
"willingness-to-pay" approach, the issue of conjoint analysis as
"common proof' relates to the factual question of whether some class
members place a high value on this feature, while others give it little or
no value. This is not simply an issue of imprecisely estimating damages
for a given class member (i.e., one class member valuing adequate and
reasonable data security at $2 and another at $10, and therefore the
average of $6 not precisely compensating either one). Rather, this
approach runs the risk of improperly estimating damages for unharmed
customers or, potentially, failing to find damages for class members who
were harmed. In fact, although conjoint analysis would yield a single
aggregate valuation for adequate and reasonable data security, responses

52. Allenby et al., Economic Valuation, supra note 26, at 440 ("[T]he quality standards for
design and analysis of conjoint data have to be much higher when used for economic valuation

than for many of the typical uses for conjoint.").
53. Cohen et al., supra note 6, at 3.
54. Notably, to yield meaningful information from which survey results can be extrapolated
to the population at issue, the survey should be properly designed, and the population properly
sampled. See, e.g., Allenby et al., Valuation of Patented Product, supra note 52, at 641

("Considerations of sample representativeness are critical to the reliability and generalizability of
any survey, conjoint or otherwise. No survey evidence should be considered admissible or

relevant unless evidence of representativeness is provided.").
55. Cohen et al., supra note 6, at 4.
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for sub-groups of respondents may indicate substantial variation,56
including some respondents' choices indicating that they do not value this
feature at all.57 Importantly, groups (or individuals) who indicate that they
do not value data security would not be harmed under a benefit of the
bargain theory. That is, the "bargain" those consumers got would have
allegedly lacked a "benefit" they did not value, meaning that their
willingness to pay for a product which explicitly excluded that feature
would have been unchanged.
This issue may be partially, though not entirely, mitigated by a
"market price premium" approach like that proposed by Anthem
plaintiffs' expert. That is, if it can be determined that the alleged conduct
inflated the prevailing price of a product by some amount, it would not
matter to the determination of impact and damages whether that amount
is equal to a given consumer's valuation of the feature at issue. Consider
again the hypothetical situation illustrated in Exhibit 2. If it can be shown,
for example, that the market price premium for data security was $1and the prevailing but-for price would therefore have been $94-that
amount would apply to all consumers that would have bought that
product in the but-for world, including Customer A (despite that customer
personally valuing data security at $2).
The issue that persists even with the market price premium approach
is that in the real world, there may not be a single product or a single price
premium that is relevant to the assessment of harm for the entire proposed
class. For example, while the plaintiffs' expert in Anthem provided an
extended discussion of how healthcare pricing varies substantially across
geographies, product offerings, and customer segments-and, indeed, of
how "prices" consumers pay can be a complex combination of premiums,
deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance 59-he nonetheless concluded
that a "market price" can be used to show that "all class members have
suffered the same loss commensurate or proportional to the price paid by

56. For example, attitudes toward, and preferences for, data security may vary across
consumers depending on age, educational attainment, income, or other factors. Id. at 6.
57. See id. In fact, an improperly designed conjoint analysis may indicate that respondents
are "irrational" and place a negative value on data security. Improperly designed conjoint analyses
may also indicate an unreasonable range in the valuation of the feature at issue, including some
respondents valuing the feature above the total price of the product. However, if the aggregation
of all results-even unreasonable ones-yields a positive valuation, the conclusion would be that

the positive valuation was "common" to the class.
58. Notably, the security-conscious Customer B would not have purchased the but-for

product for $94, meaning the improperly defined "bargain" induced that consumer to purchase a
product she otherwise would not have.
59. Rossi Report, supra note 25, at Section III.
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them." 60 Moreover, he indicated that he would "undertake surveys of
different markets" and that these surveys would be "analyzed
independently to determine market price premia in each of these distinct
markets." 6 1

However, even this approach-to the extent proof in the form of many
distinct market-specific analyses may be considered "common" to the
proposed class-would assume that there was a single data security
premium within a given "market." That is, even a "market-specific"
survey, by construction, would imply only two possible outcomes: either
every consumer in that market was injured-and necessarily in the same
amount-or no consumer was injured. However, to the extent price
premia for data security vary across geographies, product offerings, and
customer segments within markets (as defined by the survey designer),
such surveys would (potentially inappropriately) assume that price
premiums are identical across these parameters. Requisite testing of such
an assumption would be necessary to determine whether it is appropriate
given the facts of the case at hand.

60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. at 23.

